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The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a unique opportunity to 
analyse how populist leaders and parties govern. This study investigates the factors 
shaping the policies of populist governments. First, an ideal type of populist policy 
making is developed, elaborating the policy content, the policy discourse and the policy 
making procedure of populism. Then a congruence analysis is applied to test the 
conformity of policy making patterns with the ideal type in seven countries where 
populist parties have been in government. We study the two established cases of 
populist governance in the EU (post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland), Greece 
where left-wing populist Syriza and the right-wing populist Anel governed between 
2015 and 2018, two countries where populist parties had minor influence in 
governments (Lithuania and Slovakia) and two countries from the EU neighbourhood 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina and Turkey) where hybridization tendencies of populist 
governance can be observed. Policy making patterns are investigated in three policy 
areas: criminal justice policy, economic policy, and family policy. Our findings suggest 
that populist parties have a predominant role in shaping government policies in the 
policy discourse dimension. In addition, our analysis confirm that populist rulers may 
appear as particularly effective in policy reforms by circumventing conventional 
institutionalised policy mechanisms. Unmediated, top-down consultations and 
adversarial, polarising narratives accompanies policy changes when populist leaders 
govern. These features tend to undermine the institutions of liberal democracy and they 
inevitably foster social and political polarisation. There are two important implications 
of the discursive power of populism in policy making: a general need of wording policy 
messages in non-technocratic everyday language and a specific support of independent 
local journalism initiatives as highly trusted sources of policy information.
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1. Introduction 
The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a novel opportunity to study the 
way in which populist leaders and parties rule. This task investigates the factors shaping the 
policies of populist governments. First an ideal type of populist policymaking is developed, 
elaborating the policy content, the policy discourse and the policymaking procedure of the 
populism. Then a congruence analysis (pattern-matching analysis) is applied in order to test the 
conformity of policymaking patterns with the ideal type in 7 countries where populist parties 
have been in government. 
The policy aspects of populism and their relation to polarising policy practices have largely 
been neglected in populism studies. Since the seminal article of Mudde (2004) on to the 
emergence of a populist Zeitgeist in Western Europe, the scholarship of populism research has 
focused on political actors and discourses of populism and particular attention was devoted to 
the ambiguous relationship between populism and liberal democracy (Canovan, 1999; Jagers 
and Walgrave, 2007; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). The lack of attention to the real-
world consequences of populist governance is all the more striking in that in the past decade, 
populist parties have come into governing positions in several European countries and in the 
Americas (Hawkins and Littvay, 2019). Policy reforms that were adopted by populist 
governments may have tangible impact on social and political polarisation although this effect 
is yet to be explored. The fact that populist parties and leaders are in power thus offers a novel 
opportunity to study the practice of their governance and policy making. In this respect, the 
case of Central and Eastern Europe seems particularly relevant as ‘in these countries, populism, 
if anything, is even more widespread’ (Kriesi, 2014, p. 372) than in Western Europe.  
Accordingly, our research has the ambition to conceptualise the specific features of populist 
policy making and to suggest a way in which to study this phenomenon. To this aim we 
theoretically address three core elements of policy making: the substantive (the content), the 
procedural and the discursive patterns of populist policies. This synthesis working paper is 
structured as follows: After presenting the analytical framework and the methodology of the 
research we reconstruct the implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies. Then 
as an antithesis of the liberal ideal type we elaborate an ideal type of populist policy making. 
Finally, we summarize the main findings of the congruence analysis in seven cases: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Turkey. The qualitative 
assessment has a focus on three policy areas: criminal justice policy, economic policy and 
family policy. In the concluding part we discuss the implications of populist policy making on 
the polarisation of societies and the future of liberal democracies. 
 
2. Analytical Framework and Methodology 
As our theoretical aspiration is to conceptualise the relevant features of populism in policy 
making, we use the Weberian ideal type framework. Recent theoretical and methodological 
discussions (Rosenberg, 2016) have provided new inspirations to apply the ideal type 
framework in empirical policy studies (Peters and Pierre, 2016). Following this agenda, we 
construct sociological ideal types (we refer to them henceforward simply as ideal types). In our 
case this means that both the substantive and the discursive components are constitutive 
elements of the policy making ideal types, while the context of social relationships is reflected 
through the procedural components.  
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We apply the method of congruence analysis (Blatter and Haverland, 2012) also called as 
pattern-matching analysis (Yin, 1984) to investigate the empirical relevance of our ideal type 
of populist policy making. Using this method in qualitative case study analysis ensures that our 
selected cases are investigated through theoretically well-elaborated expectations as we directly 
link the empirical findings to the ideal type. We investigate the two established cases of populist 
governance in the European Union: post-2010 Hungary and post-2015 Poland. We have also 
selected Greece that was governed by two populist parties, the left-wing populist Syriza and the 
right-wing populist Anel between 2015 and 2018. Two countries were chosen as they represent 
cases of populist parties as minor coalition government partners: Slovakia because of the 
government position of the right-wing partly populist Slovak National Party (SNS) after the 
parliamentary elections of 2016, and Lithuania because of some episodes of populist parties in 
government. In addition, two countries are investigated from the European Union 
neighbourhood as well: Bosnia and Herzegovina that represent a peculiar case of populist 
governance in an ethnically divided context and Turkey where we can observe the hybridization 
tendencies of populist governance (a shift from flawed democracies towards authoritarianism) 
under the AKP, the longest-ruling populist party in Europe (Yabanci and Taleski, 2018). This 
working paper summarizes the main findings of the country cases; more detailed studies are 
available in the DEMOS project cloud. It is important to note that methodologically the 
qualitative assessment of the major policy changes does not have an aspiration that we expect 
from classical explorative case studies; the applied logic of case selection and the empirical 
reconstruction of the typical policy patterns supported by area specific policy expertise of the 
researchers, however, fits the qualitative congruence analysis research design and the 
conceptual ambitions of this task. 
3. Conceptual Departure: The Liberal Democratic Model of Policy Making 
Governance and policy making varies between countries and across time: A variety of actors 
and institutions participates in the delivery of governance functions and their configurations 
delineate different governance models (Peters and Pierre, 2016). However, we argue that 
beyond the variations of governance types the ideal type of policy making in liberal 
democracies is implicitly applied. 
One tacit assumption of policy making models in liberal democracies is that a relatively 
coherent system of ideas shapes policy positions: Ideas play a key role in the policy content and 
‘can explain crucial aspects of policy development’ (Béland, 2009, p. 704). At the same time, 
although majoritarian preferences have a pivotal role, they are substantively constrained by the 
protection of minority rights. In addition, policy content is heavily influenced by area-specific 
technocratic expertise (Weible, 2008) and mainstream policy paradigms that tend to create 
policy monopolies (Baumgartner et al., 2009). As a result, the content of policies is mostly 
stable and policy changes are mainly incremental.  
A main procedural feature of policy making in liberal democracies is institutionalism: The 
policy process is constrained and channelled by formal and informal institutions, thus political 
leaders have a low level of discretion (Przeworski et al., 1999). The constitutional 
embeddedness of pluralism limits the majoritarian logic as pluralism acknowledges the role of 
different social and political actors throughout the policy cycle (Baumgartner et al., 2009). This 
implies that public discussions inform the electorate on proposed policy alternatives. In 
discursive terms rival policies in this policy making model are interpreted through competing 
discourses and policy frames by manifold stakeholders. Policy discourses with high and 
positive valence (Cox and Béland, 2013) are generally applied. At the same time, the role of 
discursive governance (Korkut et al., 2015) is limited: Although strategic metaphors are 
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typically used in government discourses, public policy problems are usually conceptualised 
with specific policy language terms. Table 1 summarises the main components of the ideal type 
of policy making in liberal democracies. 
Table 1: Ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies 
Policy content Policy embedded into a relatively coherent system of ideas 
Central role of mainstream policy paradigms supported by area-specific policy 
expertise 
Majoritarian policy preferences constrained by the protection of minority rights 
Incremental policy changes dominate 
Policy process Constrained by formal and informal institutions 
Plurality of participating actors in each stage of the policy process 
Public discussion on proposed policy alternatives 
Policy discourse Limited use of discursive governance 
Competing discourses and policy frames 
Dominant policy discourses with high and mainly positive valence 
 
We use the ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies as an anchor, a potential antithesis 
of the populist policy making ideal type. Populist policy making, however, is not necessarily a 
fully divergent, alternative model leaning towards illiberal governance (Pappas, 2014). Indeed, 
populist policy making might appear within liberal democracies; similar to the ‘étatiste’ model 
of governance that can operate either in authoritarian or in democratic political regime contexts 
(Peters and Pierre, 2016, pp. 91–92). 
4. Populist Policy Making: Constructing an Ideal Type 
Populism is a particularly precarious conceptual edifice in contemporary political science 
(Aslanidis, 2016) and encompasses three competing understandings. One approach interprets 
populism as a political logic ‘through which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises 
government power based on direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers 
of mostly unorganized followers’ (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). Another group of scholars considers 
populism as a political communication style (Knight, 1998) characterised by a Manichean logic 
(‘elite’ vs. ‘people’) and adversarial narratives as well as the depiction of crises that imply the 
need for immediate government intervention. The third main perspective, the ideational 
approach conceptualises populism as a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be 
ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the 
corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of ‘the volonté générale 
of the people’ (Mudde, 2004; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012). Accordingly, populism 
fundamentally opposes both elitism and pluralism (Mudde, 2004). 
The umbrella term of populism suggested by Pappas (2014) provides an appropriate theoretical 
framework for our research. He focuses on majoritarian political logic and polarising narratives, 
encompassing thus the discursive framing as well as the procedural features of populism in 
policy making. We enrich this perspective with Weyland’s idea (2001) on personalistic 
leadership and the unmediated contact between the political leaders and the electorate. 
Copyright Bartha et at. (2021). 
 7 
5. Populist Policies: A Substantive View 
Although left-wing and right-wing populists have divergent visions about ‘good society,’ they 
also have some policy preferences in common. In foreign policy, they take a critical stance 
towards supranational institutions, advocate the primacy of nation states and reject liberal 
globalisation. In economic policy, populists tend to blame, and when in power, punish the 
unpopular banking elite (O’Malley and FitzGibbon, 2015) and transnational companies 
(Bartha, 2017). Some typically assumed populist policy positions, however, derive from 
intermingling populism with nationalism (De Cleen, 2017). Law-and-order punitive measures 
in criminal justice policy, negation of extending LGBTQ rights (Pappas, et al., 2009) or 
perceiving gender equality as jeopardising the idea of the traditional family (Korkut and Eslen-
Ziya, 2011; Szikra, 2019) can be deduced from right-wing nationalism of the respective 
political parties and not from their populism.  
As populism travels across ideologies, the assumed common substantive components of 
populist policies are malleable and transient. While part of the European scholarship conflates 
the thin ideology of populism with thick right-wing nativism (Wodak, 2015), in Latin America 
as well as in Mediterranean Europe a left-wing, inclusionary type of populism has developed 
(Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014). Empirical observations confirm that the marriage of 
populism with nativism and the subsequent ethnic polarisation is not necessary, but contingent. 
Taggart denotes ‘the empty heart of populism’ as a reflection of the lack of core values that 
implies its essentially ‘chameleonic’ nature (Taggart, 2004, p. 275). The Muddean thin ideology 
approach also admits the substantive flexibility of populism implying a wide array of populist 
policy measures (Mudde, 2004). 
Though policy contents advocated by right-wing and left-wing populists may differ 
fundamentally, certain common features of populist policies can be theoretically detected. 
Populist leaders are particularly responsive to the majoritarian preferences of their electorate 
(Urbinati, 2017). Accordingly, populist policy measures tend to harm minority interests, and 
they are hostile towards unpopular minorities (Pappas et al., 2009). Populist majoritarianism is 
potentially incompatible with policy expertise: in the case of a marked gap between popular 
beliefs and area-specific policy evidence, the populist stance is by definition against expert 
positions shaped by mainstream policy paradigms. Striking examples include the anti-
vaccination stance of Italian 5 Stars Movement leaders; the anti-green attitudes of Donald 
Trump or the economic unorthodoxy of the Greek Syriza. The reservation of populists towards 
mainstream policy paradigms and traditional epistemic communities often implies 
unconventional policy innovations and radical, paradigmatic policy reforms. 
6. Procedural Features of Populist Policy Making 
The procedural dimension of our ideal type is informed by the possible incompatibility between 
populism and liberal democracy and its preference to the majoritarian rule—a thesis widely 
shared in the scholarship (Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Pappas, 2014). The ‘populism as 
political logic’ approach stresses the importance of personalistic leaders and their use of ‘direct, 
unmediated, uninstitutionalized support’ (Weyland, 2001, p. 14). 
Populist governments tend to undermine the edifice of liberal democracy through eroding the 
rule of law, neutralising checks and balances and marginalising political opposition (Batory, 
2016; Taggart and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2016). Discriminatory legalism is a general pattern of 
left-wing and right-wing populists (Weyland, 2013), although especially valid for exclusionary 
populism (Müller, 2016). However, the inclusionary populist Syriza government was also 
heavily criticised for its legal procedural practices (governing by decrees, appointing loyal 
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judges). The inclusionary type of populism does not necessarily undermine the institutions of 
liberal democracy, but tends to circumvent them: For instance, the 5 Stars Movement is strongly 
in favour of direct democracy. That is, although to different degrees and by different means, 
populists have a willingness to directly communicate with the electorate.  
Populist policy making means a different relation between governing politicians and other 
policy actors compared to the implicit policy making ideal type of liberal democracies. While 
usual policy process modelling frameworks such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993) consider subsystem-specific policy experts as main contributors to 
the policy process, populist political leaders tend to be hostile towards technocratic expertise, 
downplaying the advisory role of epistemic communities in general, and the related 
supranational institutions in particular. The adversarial stance of populists against technocrats 
who created policy monopolies is inherent; indeed, populist and technocratic forms of political 
representations are two different alterations of party-based governments of liberal democracies 
(Caramani, 2017). An important consequence of sidelining veto-players and neglecting expert 
consultation is that the decision making process under populist rule fundamentally differs from 
that in liberal democracies along each of the temporal dimensions specified by Grzymala-Busse 
(2011). Thus, policy making under populist governance tends to have a significantly faster 
tempo and a shorter duration with frequent episodes of acceleration and an unpredictable 
timing. 
7. Populist Policy Discourses 
Discourses can play a formative role in policy change (Schmidt, 2008) and they have a 
particular status in populist policy making. Approaches that understand populism as a 
communication style (Jagers and Walgrave, 2007) or as a discourse (Aslanidis, 2016) pinpoint 
that populist policy making exhibits strong discursive features. Indeed, while populism is at 
odds with the institutionalised process of policy making, it is particularly susceptible to apply 
instruments of discursive governance (Korkut et al., 2015), and uses strategic metaphors 
extensively to ground and legitimise policy measures.  
Scholarship also suggests that populist governments use a tabloid and emotional 
communication style with moralising adversarial narratives and crisis frames (Moffitt, 2015) 
reinforcing polarisation in policy positions. While the chameleonic flexibility of populist 
governments can imply policy choices in line with expert policy evidences, discursively 
populists often have a clear anti-expertise stance (Thirkell-White, 2009). 
Populist government leaders tend to use Manichean language and adversarial frames in 
legitimising policy decisions: The menace of dangerous immigrants was frequently invoked by 
both Salvini and Trump in order to promote increased securitisation and law-and-order 
measures. Populist discourses may portray both transnationally embedded liberal groups and 
socially marginalised unpopular minorities as enemies of the ‘real people’ (Müller, 2016) thus 
forging social polarisation. Arguments against liberalism are discursively linked to attacks 
against liberal ‘censorship’ and reveal the potentially subversive character of populism: popular 
beliefs have a higher moral stance than the values promulgated by elites. Table 2 summarises 
the main features of the populist policy making ideal type (Bartha et al., 2020a).
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Table 2: Ideal type of populist policy making 
Policy content Ideologically multifaceted and diverse 
Heterodox policy elements with frequent policy innovations challenging mainstream 
policy paradigms 
Reflecting majoritarian preferences, hostility against unpopular minorities 
Radical and paradigmatic policy reforms 
Policy process Circumventing established institutions, downplaying veto-players 
Limiting participation of technocratic policy experts, opposition parties and civil 
society actors 
Direct communication with the electorate 
Policy discourse Extensive use of discursive governance  
Tabloid, highly emotional communication style, recurrent crisis framing 
Dominance of Manichean discourses 
 
8. Applying the Ideal Type: Populist Policy Making in Seven Countries 
with Populist Governance 
This section summarises the main findings of the seven countries investigated by the DEMOS 
national research teams within the DEMOS project. National research teams applied 
congruence analysis in three policy areas: criminal justice policy, economic policy and family 
policy. The detailed studies are available in the DEMOS project cloud. 
8.1 Populist Policy Making in EU Member States 
8.1.1 Greece 
After 2010 the fiscal adjustment and internal devaluation policies deepened economic recession 
and its social impact, and, despite some progress, the reform programme failed to change 
fundamentally Greece’s growth model and public administration. These economic policies 
triggered populist reactions in 2010-2014 which soon, in 2015, brought to power a coalition of 
a strong populist party of the Left, Syriza, and a smaller nationalist/populist, right-wing party 
(the Anel). After coming to power Syriza changed course in terms of its populist promises 
regarding economic policy content. It employed policy processes already used by its 
predecessors in power. And it continued with a populist rhetoric, hoping to prolong its term in 
power. 
Regarding the content of policies, Syriza proved chameleonic enough in the field of economic 
policy. It tried to negotiate its way through a reversal of economic austerity, but soon 
backtracked and implemented the neoliberal policy which informed the MoUs (Memoranda of 
Understanding) agreed between Greece and its creditors. On criminal justice issues, Syriza 
proceeded with reforms of the criminal code, the prison system and anti-corruption which only 
to an extent served the necessary modernisation of the criminal justice system. For the most 
part, Greek populists opted for criminal justice measures either reflecting their radical left-wing 
ideology or serving their struggle against political opponents (former governing parties). As for 
family policy, the content of policies was not hostile to unpopular minorities. However, it also 
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combined a social democratic drive to expand social protection to the less protected categories 
of the population with a tendency to serve the particular electoral pool of Syriza. 
The process of policy making under the Syriza populist government reflected, among other 
things, the populists’ antagonism against what they called the old political system or the corrupt 
elites. More concretely, Greek populists did not trust institutions which they did not control 
(i.e., independent authorities) or stakeholders whom they could not influence (e.g. professional 
or labour associations in which they did not hold the majority). In other words, Greek populists 
tried to do away with institutional constraints in policy making. Leadership in policy making 
was exclusively entrusted to government ministers and their close entourage, while 
participation in policy making was trimmed, if not completely curtailed, unless it converged 
with the priorities of populists.  
With regard to policy discourse, throughout its period in opposition (2010-2014) but also in 
government (2015-2019), Syriza adopted an aggressive Manichean rhetoric. Syriza denounced 
the austerity inspired policy programme imposed by the country’s creditors after 2010 as the 
root cause of Greece’s problems. Along with other, minor opposition parties, including right-
wing ones, and along with its government coalition partner (Anel), Syriza pursued a fierce 
confrontation with its opponents on the grounds of an anti- MoU campaign, which split society 
along a MoU/anti-MoU dividing line and increased polarisation to unprecedented levels.  
8.1.2 Hungary 
Ruling since 2010, the government of Hungary under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán has been the first clear populist administration of an EU member state that has, at the 
same time, moved away from liberal democracy. The governing party Fidesz has already spent 
a decade in power that allowed its policies to crystallise. These features make the Hungarian 
case especially suitable for illustrating the ideal type of populist policy making. 
Both discursive and procedural features of Hungarian criminal justice policy have been fully 
congruent with the ideal type. The dominance of Manichean discourses and tabloid, highly 
emotional communication patterns with recurrent crisis framing was detected especially in the 
discourses revolving around hate crime legislation. In the policy process, a striking populist 
feature of Hungarian criminal justice policy has been the abandonment of the scientific-
dogmatic foundations during the legislation process. Findings are less unanimous in the policy 
content dimension, although the excessive majoritarianism built upon hostility against 
unpopular minorities was pervasive. 
A similar pattern can be detected in post-2010 Hungarian economic policy. Discursive patterns 
are fully congruent with the theoretical expectations; in economic policy reasoning a specific 
feature of Manichean framing is the recurrent enmification of international actors (the 
International Monetary Fund and a conflation of global financial market actors, George Soros 
and EU institutions). Procedural features of economic policy making have also been rather 
congruent with the ideal type. A striking feature of the selective consultation policy of the 
Hungarian government is reflected in the use of Strategic Partnership Agreement policy that 
segments the corporate landscape to ‘good’ (productive) versus ‘bad’ (speculative) companies. 
The economic policy content, however, frequently differs from the discursive patterns: an 
enlightening example of this apparent inconsistency is applying neoliberal macroeconomic 
stabilisation measures together with harsh discursive rejection of austerity policies. This 
pattern, however, is a genuine practice of discursive governance, a core component of populist 
policy making, 
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Discursive enmification was also prevalent in post-2010 Hungarian family policy that linked 
the discourse of demographic crisis to the rehabilitation of traditional family policy ideals. In 
this context pro-natalist and childcare incentives coupled with a disallowance of certain 
entitlements from non-traditional families (e.g. adoption of children by LGBTQ couples). In 
family policy, there has been a general ideational consistency between policy content and policy 
discourses. This policy making was embedded in the procedural context of parliamentary 
supermajority of the governing Fidesz that combined cardinal legislation with individual 
member’s bills. These techniques circumvented veto-players and limited involvement of 
external policy experts, opposition parties or civil society actors in policy debates. 
8.1.3 Lithuania 
Throughout the independence period so far, Lithuania has had three governments that included 
populist parties. The first populist party to get into the government was the Labour Party after 
the Seimas elections in 2004. The second populist party to become part of the governing 
coalition was the National Resurrection Party. It entered the Government after the Seimas 
elections of 2008. In both cases populist parties experienced major internal shake-downs and 
split into two separate factions, which undermined their ability to become more relevant for 
policy making and governance. To date the period of 2012-2016 was the most successful for 
populist parties, as two of them – the Labour Party and the Party Order and Justice – became 
part of the governing coalition after the parliamentary elections. 
In general, policy making and governance in the area of criminal justice may be described as 
populist content, process and discourse free. This may be explained by the fact that criminal 
justice area of policy was never high on the Lithuanian policy agenda. In terms of policy content 
in the area of economic policy two of the parties analysed (the Labour Party and the Party Order 
and Justice) may be described as ideologically multifaceted and diverse, while the National 
Resurrection Party stayed rather consistent ideologically and supported liberal agenda. Most 
important issues related to the economic policy area during the studied periods were (and some 
still are) increasing the minimal monthly wage, amending (decreasing) personal income 
taxation and approval of the new Labour Code (liberalisation of work relations). While in the 
area of economic policy heterodox policy elements, policy innovations challenging mainstream 
policy paradigms and radical and paradigmatic policy reforms were never on the agenda of 
populist parties, the stance that the parties took or policy initiatives that they advocated were 
resonant of the majoritarian preferences in most cases (and arguably contradictory at the same 
time, as for example, increasing minimal monthly wage and liberalising the Labour Code). 
In terms of policy process in the area of economic policy, none of the analysed parties has 
shown consistent signs of populist policy making and governance. Only direct communication 
with the electorate was among the attractive options for the populist parties. However, this 
option was not used extensively. Policy discourse in the area of economic policy was also rather 
moderate in terms of populism. One might find traces of tabloid, emotional communication 
style in the rhetoric of the populist parties. However, it was not radical. Sometimes Manichean 
discourses were evoked, especially, with regard to justification of policy measures taken on the 
grounds of being conducive to higher well-being of the poor or ‘common (average) people’. 
The area of family policy was more prone to become populated with populist elements, at least 
by the Party Order and Justice. In terms of policy content, the most hotly debated issues in this 
policy area were related to the law on the protection of minors from the negative effect of public 
information and a constitutional amendment linking definitions of family and marriage as well 
as the artificial insemination law. While the Labour Party and the National Resurrection Party 
mostly avoided the initiative (as well as participating in the discourses) on these issues (though 
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supporting the majoritarian preferences in most cases), the Party Order and Justice was an 
ardent advocate of majoritarian preferences (family and traditional values) and dismissed all 
the initiatives of the LGBT community. This party also was discontent with participation of 
civil society groups in the policy process and tried to diminish the role of veto-players (for 
example, the President). The discourse related to the family policy of this populist party was 
full of Manichean content, dismissing the ‘liberal agenda of elites’ and destructive ‘values of 
the West’. 
8.1.4 Poland 
After the double (presidential and then parliamentary) electoral victory of 2015 by the United 
Right coalition consisting of the dominant Law and Justice party (PiS) and its minor partners: 
Poland Together (after November 2017 Agreement Party) and Solidaristic Poland designed and 
implemented macroeconomic, family and criminal justice policy. One of the striking features 
of PiS’s political position is its immunity to internal (opposition) and external (EU institutions) 
critique concerned particularly with the breaches of the rule of law and attacks on the 
independence of judiciary. One of the explanations of its sustained electoral support is the 
ability to deliver on the promises related to social spending, particularly on 500 Plus programme 
which is widely recognized in society and which was recently extended to every child. In 
combination with the cultural conservatism and the ability to create a sense that the government 
started to care about less well-off people it allowed PiS to improve in 2019 on its good score in 
the 2015 elections. This analysis allowed to highlight these aspects of three public policies 
which contributed to a large extent to these successes. It was not only the populist content 
expressed in the ideological unorthodoxy and the ability to construct and reflect majoritarian 
opinions but also the populist policy making based on a relaxed approach to best standards of 
policy and law-making procedures (i.e. a willingness to employ fast track procedures, poor 
expertise, short public consultations, poor quality of the Regulatory Impact Assessments, 
occasional breaches of European Law).  
Most importantly, PiS used extensively the discursive governance measures to define the 
reality, offer the moral evaluation and legitimize proposed policy solutions. What all the 
policies shared was the populist communication strategies based on people-centrism, anti-
elitism, occasional othering, constructions of crisis and context-related strategies like economic 
nationalism, penal populism or essentialisation of traditional family. It is worth emphasising 
two important factors not captured by the analytical framework: the significance of timing and 
the role of staged events, including media events, party conventions and other devices used to 
emulate the sense of direct communication with the electorate. 
8.1.5 Slovakia 
The Slovakian case study explored that the policy making impact of the investigated Slovak 
National Party (SNS) was fairly limited as a minor partner in coalition government. Three 
specific factors limited the role of SNS: the Manifesto of the Government, the thin portfolio of 
ministries controlled by the party and the transformation of SNS from a classical nationalist 
party to a rather moderate, conservative, patriotic/nativist party under Andrej Danko. In this 
context, SNS typically presented policy proposals aimed at increasing income or benefits for 
the broader electorate, and as a result, implying a deterioration of public financial positions. 
SNS has not initiated radical and paradigmatic policy reforms and has not challenged 
mainstream policy paradigms with policy innovations, with one exception, a special sectoral 
tax on food retail chains. Still, SNS illustrates the multifaceted character of populist parties as 
Copyright Bartha et at. (2021). 
 8 
it endorses left-wing economic policies but exhibits conservative social values (cf. Norris, 
2020). 
There is no evidence that SNS deliberately attempted to limit participation of technocratic 
policy experts, opposition parties and civil society actors in the policy process, although it 
initiated some policy measures without consulting with coalition partners, government agencies 
or broader stakeholders. At the same time, SNS was active to present its populist policy 
suggestions in public debates. These policy initiatives typically did not pass in the Parliament 
(such as abolishing e-vignettes, or a ban on Sunday shopping), or did not materialise for other 
reasons (e.g. the costly idea to launch national air carrier, or a plan to establish a Ministry for 
Tourism Industry).  
SNS could not capitalise on the typical discursive instruments of populist parties in policy 
making: policy communication of the party tends to lack tabloid and highly emotional 
communication patterns. These policy communication patterns were rather sporadic and 
temporary, although clearly adopted not only by SNS but also by Smer-SD in both economic 
and family policy areas during the election campaign of the 2019–2020 autumn and winter 
period. The blurred discursive approach of SNS explored the lack of authenticity of the party 
in issue ownership and likely contributed to the party’s losing parliamentary representation in 
2020.  
8.2 Populist Policy Making in the EU Neighbourhood 
8.2.1 Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Populist politicians have been widely using discursive governance instruments and found a way 
to abuse susceptibility of citizens and their sentiments in most of the investigated policy issues: 
economic growth and well-being, employment opportunities, sentencing of the most dangerous 
criminals, organised crime and corruption, fertility or the role of the traditional family in 
Bosnian society. Making unrealistic pre-election promises, manipulating data about economic 
statistics, introducing the most severe sentences in the penal law system and selective anti-
corruption measures affecting only political opponents have been part of the populist policy 
toolkit.  
In the field of economic policy, we notice non-transparent governmental communication 
regarding major economic issues. While citizens are well-informed about specific sectorial 
trends (that they usually are not able to understand), they are not properly informed about some 
core indicators of employment, attracting foreign investments or providing tax 
exemptions/benefits to foreign investors in the country. A striking example is a shift of 
employment law towards a strongly pro-employer oriented regulation without any public debate 
or any attempt of a reasonable policy explanation.  
In criminal justice policy an overwhelming drive of penal populism can be detected, although 
most of the politicians’ promises made in the field of criminal law remain unfulfilled. The most 
debated issue in criminal justice policy has been life imprisonment in the Criminal Code of 
Republic of Srpska in 2020 obviously derived from the populist policy agenda. 
Populist elements of family policy have been crystallised around fertility; the decline of birth 
rate has been considered as one of the most serious challenges faced by Bosnian society. The 
identified challenge has been mainly contextualised in a traditional pronatalist frame, while 
multiple goals concerning work-life balance, combating child poverty, support of child 
development and welfare at the earliest age have been secondary. This clearly indicates that 
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area-specific policy expertise plays only a secondary role compared to the populist family 
policy agenda. 
8.2.2 Turkey 
The Turkish national case study indicated that policy making features of AKP are strongly 
congruent with the populist policy making ideal type. It demonstrated that in terms of policy 
content, policy process and policy discourse, the AKP displays characteristics associated with 
the theoretical expectations. While these tendencies are strongest in macroeconomic policy 
making and weakest in family policy, the AKP does not shy away from using these strategies 
when it deems it necessary. Analysis also shows that the AKP is consistently congruent with 
the ideal populist type in policy process and policy discourse in terms of three major policy 
areas investigated in this working paper.  
These limited observations hint that Turkish populist are less interested in policy content and 
more interested in policy processes and the discourse they use. This fact reveals populists’ 
relative lack of concern for institutions and legalities, demonstrated in their willingness to 
disregard these formalities once they are in power. They use policy processes and discourse to 
affect and change policy. Accordingly, any attempt to block the advance of populism should 
focus on these areas rather than policy content. 
9. Conclusions 
Populist parties have increasingly gained power in Europe and beyond offering a novel 
opportunity to study the way they govern. The main aim of this article was to conceptualise 
policy making features of populist governments. As a point of theoretical departure, we 
reconstructed the implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies where a plurality 
of actors participates in the policy process that is constrained by formal and informal institutions 
and competing policy discourses shape policy alternatives. This policy making ideal type 
generally applies in liberal democracies independently from the functionalist model of 
governance in a broader sense. 
Then, reviewing the populism scholarship, we constructed an ideal type of populist policy 
making. The content of populist policies is partly shaped by the underlying core ideologies; 
still, policy heterodoxy, strong willingness to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive 
responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are probably distinguishing features of any type of 
populist policies. Discursively, populist political leaders tend to use crisis frames and discursive 
governance instruments such as strategic metaphors in a Manichean language to legitimise 
policy decisions. Direct communication with the electorate and circumvention of existing 
institutions is a general pattern of populist policy making, but more inclusionary variants of 
populist governance tend to respect the established democratic procedures more.  
We investigated policy making patterns in three policy areas and seven countries to assess the 
congruence of populist governance with the ideal type. Our qualitative assessment suggests a 
high degree of conformity between the ideal type of populist policy making and the selected 
cases, especially in the policy discourse dimension. In addition, our analysis confirmed that 
populist rulers may appear as particularly effective in policy reforms by circumventing 
conventional institutionalised policy mechanisms. When populist leaders govern unmediated, 
top-down consultations and adversarial, polarising narratives accompanies criminal justice 
policy, economic policy and family policy reforms; features that are rarely present in policy 
making in liberal democracies. 
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Understanding populist policy making has important theoretical and practical policy 
implications. First and foremost, it helps us explain how and why populists survive in power 
even in the longer run. Reasons for success of populist governance might include the ideological 
flexibility that closely follows majoritarian preferences of the electorate. Our findings also 
confirm the ambiguous relationship between populist governance and liberal democracy. While 
majoritarian preferences may legitimise populist policy reforms, abrupt and radical policy 
changes downplay institutional and policy expertise control mechanisms and are routinely 
supported by adversarial narratives. On the one hand, these features tend to undermine the 
institutions of liberal democracy; on the other hand, they inevitably foster social and political 
polarisation. This is particularly harmful for unpopular minorities, including the poor, the 
Roma, migrants and LGBTQ communities, who can easily become the scapegoats and the 
losers of policy changes. Given the procedural features of populism, social groups with weak 
lobbying power might easily become excluded from decision making and their voices remain 
unheard. This process leads to the decline of participatory democracy and decreases the quality 
of policy making. 
These findings have broader policy implications. It seems clear that policy content may, of 
course, oscillate, depending on the party or coalition of parties elected into power. However, 
given the framework of European Union treaties and the value system of the Union, the content 
of policies cannot flagrantly violate the rule of law. This is particularly important for criminal 
justice policy, a policy field in which populist governments are tempted to sidestep institutions 
or use the justice system as a tool in electoral competition. 
In the same vein, following the expected requirements of the functioning of democracy in 
Europe, the policy process needs to be as open and inclusive as possible. Policy formulation 
may not take place in isolated circles of governing party appointees and ministerial officials, as 
this practice hinders transparency and accountability. Governing by fiat should be curbed in 
non-crisis time periods. It is not only undemocratic, but it also leads to less efficient policy 
making. Social partners and networks of experts could contribute to drafting more cost-efficient 
policy measures and more efficiently implemented measures, as consensus would possibly be 
reached at preparatory stages of the policy cycle. 
Another aspect pertains to policy discourse. That may range from consensual to conflictual, as 
expected from players in an open-to-all democratic game. However, political parties and other 
political institutions, such as the mass media, need to remember their socialising function. They 
do not only inform citizens but also educate them. The diffusion of polarising, polemical and 
acutely confrontational speech exacerbates the negative political effects which external 
circumstances (e.g., a grave economic crisis) usually bring to bear upon democratic life. It is 
thus recommended that collective actors (parties, interest groups, mass media) socialise their 
members, target groups and audiences in the logic of open debate and convergence over policy 
issues rather than in the logic of an all-out war. 
Non-populist ‘mainstream’ democratic politicians should formulate their policy messages in a 
more citizen-oriented manner (in rather everyday language and less technocratic, area-specific 
expert wording). It does not mean adopting the populist strategies and creating the conducive 
conditions to populist agenda but rather taking social fears and anxieties into account seriously. 
It is also necessary to resign from technocratic legitimisation of policy making and artificial 
celebrity politics which can be easily portrayed as out of touch with the people. 
More efforts are needed to support professional media outlets. There is a need of strengthening 
publicly and easily available fact-checking initiatives and platforms in major policy areas at 
national and European levels. Such platforms would not only detect the misinformation 
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practices at the political level, but would also name and shame the exclusionary and inaccurate 
populist language. That would lower the cost for citizens to find independent information.  
Along the same lines, there is a special need to invest in supporting independent local 
journalism initiatives as highly trusted sources of policy information. This is particularly 
important in those societies where populist governance is coupled with increasing democratic 
shortcomings and/or a fragility of independent media. 
  
Copyright Bartha et at. (2021). 
 12 
Appendix: Populist Policy Making and the COVID-19 Pandemic 
The COVID-19 pandemic implied multiple challenges in the life of citizens and other socio-
economic actors. The populism-COVID-19 nexus was investigated by various DEMOS 
research teams (see for instance studies related to DEMOS D6.2.). Although it was not part of 
our original research plan, here we present some illustrative findings of using our populist 
policy making ideal type in understanding COVID-19 epidemiological crisis management. 
These findings are based on the study of Bartha, Kopasz and Takács (Bartha et al. 2020b), an 
investigation carried out in the frame of the DEMOS project. 
From a policy perspective, tackling pandemic challenges can be interpreted as a specific form 
of crisis management. Based on the ideal type of populist policy making the research team set 
the following expectations concerning tackling the COVID-19 pandemic in populist 
democracies versus liberal democracies. (1) Populist governments and leaders are more familiar 
in crisis management communication, thus they can manage crisis communication more 
effectively. (2) Populist governments are more likely willing to adopt strict and unconventional 
measures that are challenging basic democratic rights of citizens. (3) Populist governments are 
less likely to cooperate with broader societal actors in crystallizing crisis management policies.  
Then the applied epidemiological and the related broader societal measures were scrutinised in 
six EU member states: Hungary and Poland represented the populist governance, Austria, 
Netherlands and Portugal represented liberal democracies, while the Czech Republic was a case 
of liberal democracy with a recent shift towards populist political leadership. Although it is a 
risky adventure to provide an assessment about COVID-19 policy success in particular 
countries, the preliminary findings of the research team is that (a) warlike, emotional 
mobilisation messages of populist governments proved to be efficient in the short run, but (b) 
more consensual policy making pattern of liberal democracies –counting more with informed 
and responsible behaviour of citizens – appear to provide better policy results in the long run. 
Accordingly, the contrasting policy making ideal types of populist versus liberal democracies 
appear to be a useful framework in studying COVID-19 pandemic policies.  
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